¹ Denied by Long, 137, n. 58.

² London 1956, New York 1965. Dr Long (n. 58) accepts, as I do, the general conclusions of this work.

³ Merit and Responsibility, Clarendon 1960 (hereafter referred to as MR), footnotes to chapters ii and iii.

⁴ JHS lxxxiv (1964) 2. Cited by Long, n. 6.

⁵ See my ‘“Honour” and “Punishment” in the Homeric, Poems’ in BICS vii (1960) 23 ffGoogle Scholar. (hereafter referred to as ‘Honour’); ‘“Friendship” and “Self-Sufficiency” in Homer and Aristotle’ in CQ n.s. xii (1963) 30 ff. (hereafter referred to as ‘Friendship’); ‘Εὔχομαι, ϵὐχωλή and ϵὗχος in Homer’ in CQ n.s. xix (1969) 20 ff. (hereafter referred to as Εὔχομαι); ‘Threatening, Abusing and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems’ in JHS lxxxix (1969) 7 ff. (hereafter referred to as ‘Threatening’); and From the Many to the One: a study of personality and human nature in the context of Ancient Greek society, values and beliefs. London: Constable and Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970 (hereafter referred to as FM).

⁶ See FM 13.

⁷ Long, 138, n. 58.

⁸ MR 20 ff., 46, 54.

⁹ E.g. MR 35, ‘Honour’ 31.

¹⁰ Long, 122.

¹¹ The assertion that we must remove the deities from the poem to leave something that the social anthropologist can interpret is Dr Long's, not mine: I am prepared to attempt an interpretation of the whole, gods included, in these terms, and will do so shortly.

¹² Long, 137.

¹³ ‘Friendship’ 30 f., FM 66 n. 2.

¹⁴ Long, 126 n. 16.

¹⁵ An ‘inverted commas’ usage of agathos seems to me to occur in Sophocles, Antigone 31 and Philoctetes 873, which are termed ‘ironical’ by Jebb ad locc. At MR 193 n. 23 I express doubts about ‘ironical’ as an appropriate description, and describe the function that the usages seem to me to discharge. To my regret, I was not then aware of ‘inverted commas usage’ as a classification.

¹⁶ For such a usage of ἀγαθός and κακός, see Iliad xi 408 ff.

¹⁷ MR 47. For φιλότης, see ‘Friendship’ passim.

¹⁸ Long, 125.

¹⁹ ‘Friendship’ 36.

²⁰ For the reasons for this, see ‘Friendship’ 36 f.

²¹ MR 46 ff.

²² For homicide-contexts, see MR 52 ff.

²³ MR 10.

²⁴ MR 52 ff.

²⁵ See Odyssey viii 182 and × 72 ff. It is Odysseus' disaster when everything seemed to be in his favour that both renders him elenchistos and shows him hated by the gods. Divine hatred is an empirical matter, proved by one's fall to disaster, MR 139; and where gods are so frequently amoral and capricious, the fall need be in no way linked with one's deserts.

²⁶ See nepios in MR 29, n. 15.

²⁷ See O'Brien, M. J., The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind, Chapel Hill 1969, 22 ff.Google Scholar; and FM, 47 f., 90, 126, 160 f., 187 f., 223, 229 f., 267, 271. I had completed FM before reading Professor O'Brien's work, and was very heartened to discover my agreement with him in this matter.

²⁸ See especially Plato Laws, 861e ff., and MR 299 ff.

²⁹ This was a theme of MR. I quote one passage, related to sophrosune 246 f.: ‘From the days of Homer prudence in one's own interests has been commended as saophron. This prudence may entail the quieter virtues, and yet sophrosune not be a moral word; but it had by this time [the later fifth and earlier fourth centuries B.C.] become so much attached to the practice of such virtues, even from the most prudential of motives…’

³⁰ Long, 138.

³¹ MR 39.

³² Long, 134.

³³ MR 38 ff.

³⁴ Long, 134.

³⁵ Some of his other examples seem to proclaim their persuasive intent by their form and context, e.g. Iliad xv 203.

³⁶ As to ἀϵικής ‘meaning’ ‘ugly’, it evidently ‘means’ neither ‘ugly’ nor ‘shameful’, since the ranges of usage are different. But even if we so mistranslate it, are we to suppose that when e.g. Tydeus, , Iliad iv 396Google ScholarTydeus recoiled from the ‘ugliness’ of the πότμος he brought upon his enemies? Surely not (see Homeric fighting passim); so that in competitive usages it is the victim and/or his friends for whom it is ‘ugly’, even if we thus mistranslate ἀϵικής. (For remarks on the range of αἰσχρόν and καλόν, see MR 163 f., FM 131 f. with n. 1.) The use of νϵικϵίϵιν, ἀπϵιλϵῑν throws light on αἰσχροῑς ἐπέϵσσι; see ‘Threatening’.

³⁷ Dr Long says that Hector's death was ‘glorious’ (136, n. 53); Homer says οὐ κακιζόμϵνον, ‘not behaving as a κακός’ merely, Iliad xxiv 214/6. Death in battle, where even if one's army succeeded one had oneself failed, posed a problem for traditional Greek ἀρϵτή at all times. (See MR 66 and n. 13.) For progressive ‘up-valuations’, not of dying for one's country, but of even fighting for it, see Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, Eng. trans., Blackwell 1953, 173. It is not yet καλόν to die for one's country: that has to wait for Tyrtaeus.

³⁸ Long, 125.

³⁹ Long, 124, n. 9.

⁴⁰ MR 14.

⁴¹ Cf. also MR 47.

⁴² Cf. also ‘Threatening’ 18.

⁴³ Long, 125 f.

⁴⁴ Iliad xix 78 ff.; discussed in MR 50 f.

⁴⁵ MR 20.

⁴⁶ Long, 127.

⁴⁷ ‘Honour’ 31.

⁴⁸ I discuss Dr Long's ‘exception’ below.

⁴⁹ MR 43 ff.

⁵⁰ See ‘Honour’ 24 ff.

⁵¹ Long, 128.

⁵² See ‘Friendship’ passim.

⁵³ The general attitude of Homeric deity to Homeric man is illustrated at Iliad i 573 ff.; and note why Zeus wishes to save Sarpedon, Iliad xvi 433 ff.; and that here in Apollo's eyes the gravamen of the charge, 52, seems to be what Achilles is doing to the earth.

⁵⁴ See ‘Honour’ 30 f.

⁵⁵ See ‘Honour’ 31.

⁵⁶ MR 38.

⁵⁷ For the χάρμα of enemies in Homer, cf. Iliad iii 46–51, cited by Dr Long elsewhere.

⁵⁸ Long, 132.

⁵⁹ See MR 46 ff.

⁶⁰ See ‘Honour’ 29, where I discuss this passage.

⁶¹ See also MR 20 f., on moira and ‘ought’.

⁶² I have, however, almost completed a book in which moira is discussed in its own right.

⁶³ MR 20.

⁶⁴ Long, 137.

⁶⁵ In my forthcoming book I shall endeavour to show the power of μοῑρα in societies whose actual existence cannot be disputed.

⁶⁶ Long, 137.

⁶⁷ MR 46 ff.